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Companions-in-guilt arguments (CGA's) are arguments in which one thing is shown 
to share some similarity with another thing. This similarity can then be exploited in a 
number of ways. A common strategy is to use the similarity to undermine arguments 
against the existence of an entity. For instance, some philosophers argue that moral 
reasons would have to be categorical, and that categorical reasons don't exist (e.g. 
Mackie 1977, Joyce 2001).1 Others retort that epistemic reasons are also categorical, 
but that we cannot reasonably deny their existence. This would undermine 
categoricity as sufficient ground for rejecting moral reasons too (e.g. Shafer-Landau 
2006, Cuneo 2007).  
 In metaethics, companions in guilt have so far been sought in epistemic and 
prudential judgements (for an example of the latter, see Fletcher 2018). Might 
aesthetic judgements be a further candidate? The aim of this paper is to explore this 
possibility. The focus will be on judgements of beauty and artistic merit.  
 CGA's relating moral to aesthetic judgements are unlikely to succeed unless 
aesthetic judgements are in relevant respects analogous to moral judgements. For the 
purposes of this paper, I will assume that moral judgements concern mind-
independent, non-natural facts.2 So my first task is to show how one might argue for a 
conception of beauty and artistic merit as mind-independent and non-natural. This 
occupies the next four sections of the paper. The case that I present is partly negative 																																																								
1 A reason is categorical if its rational authority is independent of our desires and interests.  
2 I will not assume that such facts exist.  
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and partly positive. I first argue against a popular conception of aesthetic properties as 
dispositions to produce responses in ideal judges. I describe this theory in section 2 
and present my arguments against it in section 3. In section 4, I explain which 
positions are left standing. In section 5, I show how certain assumptions about the 
phenomenology of aesthetic judgement can be used to defend a mind-independent 
conception of aesthetic properties. In the final section, I tackle the question whether 
aesthetic judgements can be partners in guilt to moral judgements, and help to 
undermine skeptical worries about the existence of mind-independent value and 
categorical reasons. My conclusion will be that there is hope for such arguments, 
provided aesthetic judgements are likely to concern mind-independent, non-natural 
value. I will argue that this is doubtful in the case of beauty, but more promising in 
the case of artistic merit.   
 
2. Against the dispositional view 
 
Nowadays, many philosophers endorse a mind-dependent form of realism about 
aesthetic properties. According to this view, an artwork's beauty or goodness consists 
in the work's disposition to produce a positive response in well-placed judges. This 
dispositional view is inspired by Hume's essay Of the Standard of Taste. Hume starts 
with a paradox in our thought about aesthetics: on the one hand, we think that there is 
no arguing about taste. On the other hand, we think of certain artists as so much better 
than others that anyone who denies this must be making a mistake. Hume suggests 
that the first thought is explained by the (correct) sense that judgements of taste, 
including judgements of beauty and artistic merit, are sentiments that lack 
representational content. If such judgements do not aim to represent the world, then 
they are not more or less correct in virtue of the accuracy of the representation. But 
Hume thinks that there can nevertheless be a standard that allows us to condemn some 
aesthetic judgements as mistaken.  
 Hume compares the situation to colour. Although (he thinks) colours are not 
properties of objects either, there is nevertheless a standard that governs colour 
judgement. This standard is the following: if properly functioning observers, placed in 
normal conditions, have a certain visual experience, then the object has some 
particular colour. Roughly speaking, an observer functions properly if s/he has 
healthy visual organs, and conditions are normal if s/he is viewing the object in 
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daylight. This standard allows us to condemn various judgements as mistaken and 
think of others as correct, without committing to the mind-independence of colour. 
Furthermore, the standard is not subjective in the sense that its relevance to colour 
judgements depends on individual endorsement. The standard is part of the public 
rules that determine whether a word expresses the concept of red, blue, green, etc.  
 Hume believes that this model can also be applied to judgements of beauty 
and artistic merit. In the case of beauty, we might say this: if properly functioning 
judges, placed in normal conditions, have a (certain) pleasurable experience upon 
examining the work, then the work is beautiful. The task is then to specify under what 
conditions a judge is functioning properly, and thus well-placed to discern the "true 
beauty" of an object.3 Hume gives us four conditions.4  
 First, an ideal judge has delicacy of taste. This is the ability to discern very 
fine differences in colour, texture, organization, etc. (especially those prone to 
provoke positive or negative responses).  
 Second, an ideal judge must be experienced with works of a similar kind. This 
comprises both the idea that she had frequent opportunity to examine work in a 
particular genre, and also to compare works that realize a wide range of the genre's 
possibilities.  
 Third, an ideal judge must approach the work without prejudice. This means 
that she should take into account the audience for which the work was intended, as 
well as its purposes. This may require placing oneself in the shoes of people different 
from oneself, and setting aside individual relations to the artist (such as jealousy).  
 Fourth and finally, a good judge must have good "sense", which appears to be 
intellect or understanding. Intellect or understanding is relevant generally, for instance 
for checking the workings of prejudice, determining the genre to which a work 																																																								
3 To make the analogy with colour even closer, we should say something about what makes for normal 
conditions. In the case of visual arts, this will no doubt involve lighting conditions, spatial positioning, 
etc. We may also be able to distinguish between well-functioning judges and normal conditions by 
reference to the distinction between abilities and their exercise (someone with various abilities may not 
always exercise them properly, perhaps because they are not in the right mood). Although this is not 
strictly kept apart in Hume's explication of conditions on an ideal judge, nothing important hinges on it.  
4 Some authors think that Hume distinguishes five criteria (e.g. Carroll 1984). But that is because they 
believe that the requirement of experience does not already comprise the idea that an ideal judge must 
have had ample opportunity to compare different works in the genre, works that realize a wide range of 
its possibilities.   
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belongs, and determining its purposes (Carroll 1984). But Hume also believes that the 
quality of art can depend on its veracity, as when the success of a novel depends on 
the extent to which it is insightful about human relationships. Good sense is required 
to discern this too.  
 Hume thinks that the standard of taste is set by the reactions or verdicts of 
those who meet these criteria:  
 
 'Strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by 
 comparison, and cleared of all prejudice, can alone entitle judges to this 
 valuable character [of the ideal judge]; and the joint verdict of such, wherever 
 they are to be found, is the true standard of taste and beauty.' (2004, pp. 86-87) 
 
 So, although Hume thinks that judgements of beauty are non-representational, 
he nevertheless thinks there is an intersubjective standard of beauty: a work is 
beautiful if and only if ideal judges react to it with a positive sentiment.  
 My reading of Hume makes him into a noncognitivist: judgements of beauty 
are appreciative states rather than representations of artworks as having certain 
properties.5 This is not the majority view in contemporary aesthetics. Many 
aestheticians endorse a cognitivist view that is also suggested by Hume's essay. 
According to this view, judgements of beauty and artistic goodness are beliefs about 
the work's tendency to produce positive responses. The property of being beautiful 
can then be identified with the property of being such as to provoke a positive 
response in ideal judges. Mutatis mutandis for artistic goodness. Views along these 
lines are defended, or at least floated, by Slote (1971), Pettit (1983), Goldman (1995), 
Railton (1998), Levinson (2007), Ross (2014), Simoniti (2017), Zangwill (2000), 
Sibley (2001) and Kivy (2015).6 																																																								
5 Zangwill (1994) also interprets Hume as a noncognitivist.  
6 There are differences between these philosophers. Some of them allow that the relevant dispositions 
are, or can be, relative to sensibilities (Goldman 1995, Levinson 2007). Others are silent on this issue. 
Railton (1998) does not explicitly endorse a dispositional understanding of aesthetic properties, though 
this would match his wider philosophical commitments. Zangwill (2000) sympathetically discusses 
(without fully endorsing) a rigidified theory of beauty, according to which it is the property of being 
such as to elicit a hedonic response in beings with our actual constitution. Others are silent on the issue 
of rigidification. Some authors seem to be talking primarily about concepts like elegant and garish, or 
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 This reductive form of realism fits with much in Hume's essay (it is in tension 
only with his claim that judgements of beauty are sentiments). For instance, it would 
make aesthetic judgements more closely analogous to judgements of colour, since 
colour judgements are most naturally thought of as representational states. 
Furthermore, Hume believes that beautiful or successful works of art have properties 
that make them suitable to trigger certain reactions in people, and that the reactions of 
art critics constitute good evidence that the work does indeed have those properties. 
This makes room for the idea that beauty and artistic merit should themselves be 
identified with properties of the object.  
 I take the dispositional view to be intended as a reductive form of realism 
about aesthetic properties, where the properties of beauty and artistic merit are natural 
properties (broadly understood). In order for the view to be reductive, the notion of an 
ideal judge must not itself presuppose or involve irreducibly evaluative properties. 
This is not obvious. For instance, you might think that delicacy of taste should be 
understood not just as the ability to make fine discriminations between perceptual 
properties, but as the ability to make fine discriminations between artistically relevant 
perceptual properties, or properties relevant to beauty. And you might think that this 
stands in the way of a reductive understanding of beauty and artistic merit.7 However 
this may be, I will not pursue this line of objection here. I will proceed on the 
assumption that an ideal judge has various abilities which do not essentially involve 
or presuppose irreducibly normative or evaluative properties.  
 
3. Why the dispositional view is mistaken 
 
																																																																																																																																																														
emotion terms like 'moving' and 'sad' (Levinson 2007, Simoniti 2017). It is not clear whether they 
would extend their view to beauty and artistic merit. Some philosophers don't explicitly discuss the 
conditions under which or in whom the response is supposed to be produced. The arguments in this 
paper are primarily relevant to dispositional theories (relative to sensibilities or not, rigidified or not) 
that identify beauty and artistic merit with a disposition to produce some kind of response in ideal 
judges. It is not entirely clear how many philosophers ultimately endorse such a view.   
7 I am not sure whether this is right. After all, an ideal judge must also be able to determine the genre to 
which a work belongs, and understand its purposes. Perhaps the relevance of perceptual properties to 
an artwork's beauty and success are wholly determined by such features. 
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I think the dispositional view is mistaken about beauty and artistic merit, because our 
judgements are not appropriately sensitive to the reactions of others, ideal or non-
ideal. The arguments to follow are relevant to any version of the dispositional view 
that makes non-redundant reference to a group of people. Reference to others is 
redundant if their sensibilities are identified in such detail that they would necessarily 
come to exactly the same judgements about all aesthetic matters as oneself. In such 
cases, one might as well say that aesthetic judgements concern dispositions to 
provoke responses in oneself. The latter view is a more extreme form of relativism 
that is not touched by my arguments in the same way. I will return to this option in 
section 4. 
 First, consider beauty. There is no serious, consistent pattern of deference with 
respect to 'beauty'. Ordinary people do not retract their judgements in light of what the 
experts say, even if they know about it. So their concept of beauty is unlikely to track 
the feelings of ideal judges. But since experts use the same concept as lay people, 
their judgements are equally unlikely to track the feelings of ideal judges. Moreover, 
even if experts did use a different concept of beauty, then their concept would be 
unlikely to track the responses of ideal judges as well, since not even experts make 
their application of 'beauty' depend on the judgements of others. Experts are likely to 
know (or at least believe) that other experts find different objects beautiful, but 
confidently proclaim an object's beauty (or lack of it) regardless.  
  A second consideration is this: there is something bizarre about judging an 
object to be beautiful that one does not find attractive (I am thinking here of cases 
where one is acquainted with the object, and found it unappealing; I am not thinking 
of cases where one is told that it is beautiful, without having seen it for oneself). But 
such a judgement should be unproblematic if the truth condition of 'X is beautiful' 
was: 'X is disposed to provoke a positive response in ideal judges'.  
 It does not help to point out that the assertion of an object's beauty 
conversationally implicates a positive experience.8 For I am thinking of the thought 
that an object is beautiful. The strangeness of such a thought cannot be explained in 
terms of conversational implicatures generated by its assertion.9  
																																																								
8 An explanation proposed by Mary Mothersill (1984).   
9 For the same point, see Hopkins (2000).  
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 One might try the following explanation: if one does not find an object 
beautiful, then that is evidence that ideal judges would not find it beautiful either. So 
it would be odd to judge it beautiful in the face of countervailing evidence.  
 But this is unconvincing. The evidence provided by one's own responses 
might be very weak, and one might know it to be weak, as would be the case if one 
knew that one's responses diverge from those whom one considers to be experts. In 
that case, one would consider oneself to have overwhelming evidence that ideal 
judges would find it beautiful. Yet it would still be odd to judge the object beautiful.  
 The foregoing considerations count heavily against the idea that 'X is 
beautiful' ascribes the property of being such as to cause a favourable response in 
ideal judges. But what about judgements of artistic merit?  
 It is more plausible that there is a pattern of deference when it comes to 
judgements of artistic merit, at least among non-experts. And there isn't  
as direct a connection between judging art to be good and having a positive response 
to it. For instance, Noël Carroll argues that what he likes and dislikes does not 
correspond to what he judges to be good or bad in art:  
 
 'I like horror novels. I enjoy staying up all night long reading them until the 
 last demon is exorcised off the last page. Yet I don't think that any of the 
 hundred or so horror novels that I've read in the last two years was  good. I 
 also read good novels in between gorging myself on pulp fiction. And I have 
 no trouble seeing that a novel like William Golding's Rites of Passage is very 
 good, miles above anything by Stephen King, a bad writer whose books I buy 
 obsessively. I may enjoy King while judging him to be inferior to Golding as a 
 writer.' (1984, p. 187) 
 
Carroll also says that he judges some art to be good that he personally dislikes.  
 So my first two arguments are not obviously applicable in the case of artistic 
merit. But the dispositional view still faces difficulties, principally to do with the 
possibility of divergence.  
 Even Hume recognized that ideal judges need not have the same reactions to 
everything. He allowed that ideal judges might diverge in preferences due to age, 
personal predilection, and the time and culture in which they grew up. If judgements 
of artistic goodness are correct only if ideal judges would respond the same way, then 
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such judgements must be incorrect when this is not the case. Hume appears to have 
thought that divergence among ideal judges would only affect comparative 
judgements of artistic merit like the following:  
 
 (1) Shakespeare is better than Milton. 
 (2) Bach is better than Mozart. 
 
In these cases, it may be plausible that such judgements are false. Each artist has so 
many virtues that it may be wrong to rank one above the other.  
 But Hume was too optimistic about the extent to which divergence can occur. 
First, meeting the requirements on an ideal judge is conceptually and metaphysically 
compatible with different responses to any work of art. But secondly, the evidence 
from art criticism suggests that such divergence actually occurs with respect to 
judgements not at all similar to (1) and (2). For instance, some film critics praise 
Boyhood. Others consider it a failure.10 Some critics rate Damien Hirst. Others think 
he is a charlatan. I could go on.  
 It is not as plausible to consider all these judgements false, unlike (1) and (2). 
More importantly, art critics don't consider all such judgements false, despite being 
aware of the fact that others don't agree with them. This makes it doubtful that their 
judgements track the joint verdict of ideal judges. In fact, the mere possibility of 
psychological divergence among ideal judges shows that they do not.  
 If one nevertheless wants to assign the property of being such as to cause a 
favourable response in ideal judges as the semantic value of 'artistically good', one 
would have to explain why the verdicts of actual critics do not track the Humean 
criteria. The obvious way to do this is to hypothesize that actual critics believe that 
those who disagree with them are not in fact ideal (either in the sense that they lack 
the required abilities or fail to exercise them properly).  
 In assessing this hypothesis, it is important to bear in mind that we are 
assuming that the notion of an ideal judge is not itself irreducibly normative: an ideal 
judge is not defined as someone who makes correct judgements of artistic merit. The 																																																								
10 For a rare, but in my view correct, detractor, see Bob Cesca, "It's OK if You Didn't Like "Boyhood", 




notion is explicated in terms of various abilities, such as the ability to make fine 
discriminations in perceptual properties, the ability to determine genres, or the aims 
internal to a work. Do critics believe that anyone who meets these criteria responds 
the same way (at least with respect to issues that are unlike Shakespeare versus 
Milton)?  
 An implicit belief in sameness of response might result from a critic's 
experience with other experts. This is not because all critics in fact think alike, but 
because there is significant overlap in judgement. This might lead one to believe that 
dissenters on a particular issue must be failing in the exercise of their abilities.  
 But suppose it became apparent that divergent judgements did not result from 
a failure to discriminate between perceptual properties, or a failure of classification 
into genres, or a failure to pick up on the content of the work. Would that make art 
critics inclined to retract their verdict?11 I suspect it wouldn't. If so, then this is 
evidence that divergences between actual critical judgements and the verdicts of ideal 
critics cannot be explained by an implicit belief that dissenters are not in fact ideal. 
 Although whether critics would retract their judgement is (or seems to be) an 
empirical question, it can be made plausible that they would not, or in any case that 
such retraction would not be explained in a way congenial to the dispositional view. 
For suppose that you yourself judge a work to be bad, but that your friends think 
highly of it. The fact that others do respond in different ways may indeed make one 
doubt one's verdict. But this is best explained by uncertainty about having missed 
some feature that would justify a different verdict. The evidence that could change 
your mind is not evidence that people in fact respond in different ways. You are 
looking for features of the work that you may have failed to notice or appreciate. If 
you became aware of those features, but failed to see them as sufficient, it would be 
reasonable for you to retain your judgement.12 But all of this is true for critics too. 
They would not consider the verdict or reactions of other critics by itself good 
evidence for an aesthetic judgement. Rather, they would consider whatever these 
reactions are based on as potential evidence. This is in tension with the idea that 																																																								
11 I am here assuming that the information about divergence does not throw doubt onto these critics' 
own exercise of their abilities.  
12 It might, theoretically, be the case that taking them to be sufficient itself consists in a belief that ideal 
judges would take them to be such, but this does not appear to be the best interpretation in light of the 
same considerations as I adduced above.  
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judgements of merit are beliefs about whether an object has properties that elicit 
certain responses in ideal people. For that would make the very fact that people 
respond in certain ways relevant evidence for a judgement about merit.13, 14 
 Some subsidiary considerations strengthen this conclusion. First, I've already 
argued that beauty is not the property of being such as to elicit a positive response 
from ideal judges. But some judgements of artistic merit are largely based on 
experiences of beauty. If beauty is the main good-maker of a work of art, but such 
judgements do not track the reactions of ideal judges, then it would be odd if 
judgements of goodness based on beauty did track them.  
 Secondly, saying that a work of art is good does not appear to be the same as 
saying that it is such that certain people would respond to it a certain way. It seems to 
be an evaluation of the work, not a description of psychological facts. It is not 
difficult to imagine situations in which people do respond to some work, yet believe 
that they ought not. Although these considerations are not decisive, it adds to the 
evidence against the dispositional view.  
 
4. What's left?  
 
The foregoing does not mean that Hume was wrong to suggest that judgements of 
beauty and artistic merit are subject to the standards that he specifies. We don't take 
seriously negative appraisals of a work based on jealously towards the artist; if a 
person fails to understand a work's internal aims, we would consider her judgement 																																																								
13 So I concur with Zangwill here: 'Perhaps it is true that we are disposed to respond in certain ways to 
aesthetic features. But we take our responses to be warranted—and we take them to be warranted in 
virtue of the aesthetic features that we experience. Even if it is true that ideal critics necessarily come 
to know a thing's aesthetic properties (or else they are not ideal), that would not be part of what being 
an aesthetic property consists in.' (2001, p. 203) However, I think that the "rigidified hedonic response-
dependent account" of beauty that Zangwill discusses in (2000) falls to very similar arguments 
(although Zangwill does not endorse this view, he seems quite sympathetic).  
14 This argument also counts against a relativized version of ideal observer theory, as defended by 
Goldman (1995). Goldman takes aesthetic properties to consist in dispositions to produce various 
responses in ideal observers who belong to certain groups (presumably groups consisting of people 
similar to oneself). This is still in tension with the fact that we do not consider people's responses as 
direct evidence for positive aesthetic judgements. For such responses are direct evidence for the claim 
that an artwork has the relevant dispositional property.  
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unreliable (etc.). What is wrong with the dispositional view are not the criteria, but its 
identification of beauty and merit with dispositional properties to produce responses 
in people who meet them.  
 So where does this leave us? There are at least three remaining theories. The 
first is noncognitivism. According to this view, judgements of beauty and artistic 
merit are not beliefs about the instantiation of properties in the first place. The second 
is a form of relativism according to which aesthetic judgements are true iff they are in 
accordance with the speaker's standards.15 The third view holds that aesthetic 
judgements ascribe mind-independent properties to art.16 
 Of course, one of the difficulties raised for the dispositional view also applies 
to the idea that beauty is mind-independent. This concerns the oddity of judging a 
work beautiful that one personally dislikes.17 If one nevertheless wants to defend a 
mind-independent conception of beauty, one has to show that this aspect of 
judgements of beauty is strongly counterbalanced by other features, such that the best 
overall account favours independence of the mind.18 Let us assume that this is 																																																								
15 This view is often called 'indexical contextualism'. You might think this theory is also ruled out by 
the fact that we don't treat facts about responses as direct evidence for aesthetic judgements. But I don't 
think that is clear-cut. If one's own standards rate artworks for having various non-aesthetic properties, 
then the only way of finding out whether an artwork meet one's own standards is by acquiring 
information about the work of art, not one's responses to it (which might not stand up to one's own 
scrutiny). This would explain why only facts about the artwork count as evidence from one's own 
perspective. It does not, of course, explain why we don't treat the reactions of others as evidence that 
their judgements are true. One would have to look elsewhere for an explanation of that phenomenon 
(perhaps Björnsson & Finlay 2010 helps). 
16 This view is rarely explicitly defended. Perhaps Zemach (1991) is a proponent. 
17 Louise Hanson (2018) thinks that 'X is beautiful, but I don't like it' is not akin to a Moorean paradox. 
I think it is. The sense that can be made of such a statement depends on the fact that one can like and 
dislike an object for many different reasons. But if the features in virtue of which one judges an object 
to be beautiful are exactly those in virtue of which one dislikes it, then the statement is paradoxical 
(possibly even contradictory).  
18 As Louise Hanson (2018) points out, there is also something odd about saying 'X is wrong, but I do 
not disapprove of it'. Despite this, many metaethicists defend the mind-independence of moral 
properties. They may succeed, provided they can show that this aspect of moral judgements is 
counterbalanced by aspects that suggest mind-independence, and that have to be retained in the best 
systematic view of the nature of such judgements. An explanation of the apparent strangeness would 
also be important. 
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possible. But even if it is not, the difficulty is not obviously applicable to judgements 
of artistic merit (one does not have to find a work beautiful to judge it good). So a 
mind-independent theory belongs to the possibilities here.  
 Unfortunately, space does not permit me to assess noncognitivism. I will 
assume that it is false.19 This leaves us with relativism and mind-independence. In the 
next section, I show how to motivate the view that beauty and artistic merit are mind-
independent properties. If this motivation is convincing (which I ultimately doubt at 
least in the case of beauty), it opens the door to companions-in-guilt arguments 
relating moral to aesthetic judgements. These will be examined in the final section.  
 
5. Motivating mind-independence 
 
Some aestheticians believe that aesthetic experience has an objectivist 
phenomenology.20 Take the following passage from Zangwill (2000):  
  
 'common sense (folk aesthetics) does not represent aesthetic properties as 
 depending on our actual hedonic reactions. Intuitively aesthetic properties 
 depend on a thing's physical and sensory properties, and maybe on its context 
 as well, but not on our actual pleasures or displeasures [...] Those who fail to 
 appreciate the Alhambra are not just different but defective. ' (2000, p. 
 616) 
 
  Zangwill makes two points here. The first point is that aesthetic properties 
would appear to us as independent of our actual states of pleasure and displeasure. 
The other is that we would not be tolerant of divergent judgements of beauty 
(elegance, etc.). What he means by this is that we would not just refrain from calling 
																																																								
19 If one wants to argue against noncognitivism in aesthetics, one could apply the standard objections to 
noncognitivism about moral judgements to aesthetic judgements (principally the Frege-Geach problem 
and the problem of certitude).  
20 A view famously held by Immanuel Kant with respect to beauty (although the sense in which he took 
the phenomenology to be objective was more to do with universality than mind-independence), and 
endorsed by Zangwill (2000) and Kivy (2015), among others.  
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divergent judgements of beauty true,21 but also that we take people who make them to 
be mistaken (which presupposes that our respective judgements concern the same 
subject matter).  
 Interestingly, these are exactly the kinds of observations that push some 
metaethicists away from relativism and in the direction of mind-independent 
conceptions of moral properties. Take the view that moral judgements are true in 
virtue of the speaker's standards (as in Wong 1984, Finlay 2014). Such views are 
often rejected because they would be in tension with the way we evaluate the truth of 
moral statements (e.g. Brogaard 2008, Parfit 2011). For suppose that John says:  
 
 (1) Surrogate motherhood is wrong.  
  
If John's statement is true in virtue of his standards, and his standards forbid 
surrogacy, then his statement is true. But Bahati, whose standards allow it, would not 
judge it to be true even if she knows that John's standards condemn it. So the way in 
which Bahati and others who reject John's standards evaluate the truth of moral 
assertions does not seem to match the relativist theory about their truth conditions.  
 A closely related problem is that of disagreement. Suppose, again, that John 
says (1), and Bahati says 
 
 (2) Surrogate motherhood is not wrong.  
 
If John's statement is true in virtue of his standards, and Bahati's statement is true in 
virtue of hers, then what John and Bahati say can be simultaneously true. As a result, 
they do not really disagree with each other. John's claim concerns what is required by 
his standards, while Bahati's claim concerns what is required by hers. Yet it seems as 
if John and Bahati disagree about the same issue.22 																																																								
21 Which may be the case also for statements like 'Vegemite is tasty', if we dislike it ourselves. 
Nevertheless, we may not believe that when two people make divergent judgements about tastiness, at 
least one of them is making a mistake.   
22 This point is sometimes thought to count equally against new wave relativism, according to which a 
moral proposition is true iff it is in accordance with the standards of an assessor of the proposition. For 
a statement of the view, see MacFarlane (2007); for the criticism in terms of disagreement, see Francén 
(2010).  
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 But even if relativists can give credible explanations of patterns of truth 
evaluation and the sense of disagreement, proponents of mind-independence will 
stress phenomenology. They will say that it doesn't seem as if moral truths depend on 
contingent standards, and that it seems as if people who make divergent moral 
judgements are not just speaking falsely but making a mistake.23 And they would say 
that such impressions are best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgements 
ascribe mind-independent properties.  
 If Zangwill is right, then the same considerations apply to aesthetic 
judgements. For in that case, 
 
 (1) we do not evaluate other people's aesthetic assertions as if they are true 
 insofar as they conform to the speaker's standards, 
 (2) we believe that speakers who make divergent judgements about 
 aesthetic properties disagree about the same subject matter, 
 (3) we believe that if two people make divergent judgements about aesthetic 
 properties, then at least one of them is making a mistake, and  
 (4) we experience aesthetic properties as if they are independent of our 
 contingent standards and responses.  
 
These considerations would appear to favour a mind-independent understanding of 
aesthetic properties.  
 Of course, mind-independent is not the same as irreducible, and irreducible is 
not the same as non-natural (being water is mind-independent, but nevertheless 
reducible to other properties, which are also natural). But there are reasons to think 
that mind-independent aesthetic properties would have to be non-natural.24 
 First, Nick Zangwill (2000) argues that sensory properties are non-rigidly 
mind-dependent,25 and that aesthetic properties depend on sensory properties. If he is 																																																								
23 For considerations of this sort, see Mackie (1977), Joyce (2001), Cuneo (2007), Enoch (2011), Parfit 
(2011), Olson (2014), Streumer (2017), and many others. In the case of morals, the point is often made 
in terms of an inescapable authority that moral facts or standards appear to have.  
24 Although there are also reasons to think that they would not. Zangwill (2000) appeals to the apparent 
causal role ascribed to aesthetic properties in ordinary thought. One of these roles is perception.  
25 This means that whether something is red is not uniquely tied to the actual constitution of human 
beings. Zangwill's argument for this thesis is as follows: suppose there were Martians with an inverted 
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right, then aesthetic properties supervene on such things as appearances, which are by 
definition mind-dependent. If one wants to identify aesthetic properties with mind-
independent properties, then they would have to supervene on appearances. But what 
natural yet mind-independent property might supervene on appearances and 
reasonably be identified with aesthetic properties?  
 Secondly, any plausible mechanism that could tie our aesthetic concepts to 
natural properties would probably lead to relativism, understood as the idea that 
different communities (or even different people) refer to different properties with their 
use of 'beautiful' and 'artistic merit'. Take causal theories of reference. Such theories 
maintain that the reference of a term is determined by that which causally regulates 
the concept. What this means is that if one group systematically tokens the concept of 
beauty in response to certain features, but another systematically tokens the concept in 
response to others, then their concepts refer to different properties (Horgan & 
Timmons 1991). But this contradicts theses (2) and (3) above. So if these theses 
support mind-independence, then they also support a non-causal theory. Similar 
conclusions are likely to hold for other ways of determining a natural referent.26 
 A third reason to suspect that mind-independent aesthetic properties would 
have to be non-natural is that there is unlikely to be any relatively unified property 
that counts as natural and could be identified with aesthetic properties. The 
supervenience base of aesthetic properties is extremely diverse (especially when it 
comes to beauty and artistic merit). Anything that binds them together is likely to 
consist in effects they have on our minds. But if aesthetic properties are independent 
of our minds (and so cannot consist in dispositions to produce such effects), then our 
only option is to identify them with a huge disjunction of non-relational properties. 
Such a disjunction may be too disunified to count as the referent of our concepts.27 
																																																																																																																																																														
colour spectrum relative to our own. The experience they have when confronted with tomatoes is 
qualitatively indistinguishable from the experience we have when confronted with grass. Would we 
consider the Martians' judgements as mistaken? Zangwill thinks that we would not. This means that 
colours cannot consist of dispositions to produce sensory experiences in creatures like us.  
26 One way to ensure the same referent for all speakers is to claim that there are many conceptual truths 
relating beauty and artistic merit to non-aesthetic features. But this is deeply implausible.  
27 This last consideration is not decisive. There might be something unified about the concept of beauty 
and artistic merit, which can nevertheless explain why its referent is disunified.  
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 Although the foregoing considerations are not decisive, they are certainly 
suggestive. If Zangwill is right about the phenomenology of aesthetic judgement, non-
naturalism in aesthetics might well be plausible (I will return to this below). In the 
final section, I will discuss whether this conception of beauty and artistic merit gives 
rise to companions-in-guilt arguments relating moral to aesthetic judgement.  
 
6. Companions-in-guilt arguments 
 
A common type of companions-in-guilt argument (CGA) aims at showing that we 
should not reject the existence of some entity on the basis of an allegedly problematic 
feature, because the same feature is had by some other entity whose existence we are 
justified in accepting.28 We might understand such arguments as attempts to 
undermine the epistemic significance of the consideration used to support a negative 
existential judgement. Their force depends, among other things, on the existence of 
independent reason to accept the existence of the entity that shares the allegedly 
problematic feature.  
 But other CGAs are possible. If there is no independent reason to accept the 
existence of the entity that shares the problematic feature, then one might argue in the 
other direction, and claim that since the problematic feature warrants a negative 
existential judgement about X, it also warrants a negative existential judgement about 
Y.  
 If beauty and artistic merit are indeed non-natural, mind-independent features, 
then both types of CGA are on the table. If there is something problematic about non-
natural, mind-independent moral value, then beauty and artistic merit share in the 
problem (at least insofar as it boils down to the non-natural and mind-independent 
nature of that value, rather than its moral status). But perhaps this shows that we 
should lower our suspicion of mind-independent value, if there is some independent 
reason to think that beauty and good art exist.  
 Suppose one wants to argue for the latter claim. One way to do this is to say 
that one can simply see that certain things are beautiful, and that it would be costly to 
deny the veridicality of these apparent perceptions (notice that an analogous argument 																																																								
28 For an in-depth discussion of different types of companions-in-guilt arguments, see Lillehammer 
(2007).  
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is not as convincing for goodness in art, since judgements about that are more likely 
inferential).  
 One problem for this reasoning is that it is unclear how one could perceive 
non-natural properties in the first place. After all, they are often thought to lack a 
causal role. A second problem is that we may be able to give plausible explanations of 
the apparent perception of beauty in ways that do not require us to postulate min-
independent beauty. For instance, Kant (2013) thought that the disinterested nature of 
the pleasure that grounds a judgement of beauty plays an important role in explaining 
why it appears to be warranted by the object, rather than dependent on contingent 
features of our psychology.29  
 However, when it comes to explaining why beauty appears to be objective, 
one might say that the burden of proof is on the skeptic. Such a skeptic does not have 
the same resources available as skeptics about mind-independent moral properties. 
For instance, some philosophers think it was evolutionarily useful for humans to 
conceive of moral rules as imbued with a special authority (Joyce 2001, Olson 2014). 
But even if it was evolutionarily useful to have a sense of beauty, it is not clear why 
this sense would come with an objectivist phenomenology.30 So perhaps the task is 
not so easy. 
 One might also say that it would be absurd to conclude that nothing is 
beautiful, even apart from considerations about what explains the sense that beauty is 
mind-independent. This would be a kind of Moorean argument for aesthetic realism. 
Jonas Olson (2014, chaper 7) develops such an argument on behalf of the moral 
realist. The argument has only one premise, and goes as follows:  
 
 (1) It is a fact that torturing babies for fun is wrong.  
 (2) So, there is at least one moral fact.  																																																								
29 By 'disinterested', Kant means that the pleasure does not result from the fact that the existence of the 
beautiful object serves the satisfaction of our desires. 
30 An option might be to relate the development of a sense of beauty to the use of seeing certain 
features as objectively valuable (e.g. features that are conducive to health). Thanks to Wessel van 
Dommelen for this suggestion. Another possibility is to relate the development of a sense of beauty to 
practices that sustain a sense of community. Perhaps that is somehow furthered by the impression that 
certain artefacts or rites are objectively beautiful. This is of course highly speculative and not initially 
as promising as evolutionary explanations of the belief that morality is objective.  
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The idea behind this argument is that it is not clearly more plausible that there are no 
moral facts than that torturing babies for fun is wrong. Since, by hypothesis, the truth 
of (1) requires the existence of mind-independent moral facts, we have reason to 
accept at least one mind-independent moral fact.  
 Realists about mind-independent beauty might argue in a similar fashion. 
They might say:  
 
 (1*) It is a fact that Monument Valley is beautiful.  
 (2*) So, there is at least one aesthetic fact.  
 
Again, the idea would be that premise (1*) is much more plausible than whatever 
leads to skepticism about the existence of mind-independent value.  
 Olson ultimately rejects the Moorean argument because there would be 
plausible explanations of our moral thought and discourse that do not appeal to moral 
facts. Such explanations crucially involve evolutionary tales about the benefits of 
beliefs in objective moral facts. But if such debunking explanations are not 
forthcoming in the case of beauty, the Moorean argument has more force in the 
aesthetic case.31 If so, then one can run a CGA relating moral to aesthetic value as 
follows:  
 
Companions-in-Guilt Argument 1 
 
P1. Beauty is a mind-independent, non-natural value.  
P1. We have good (Moorean) reason to think that beauty exists.  
C1. So, we have good reason to think that at least one mind-independent, non-natural 
value exists.  
P4. Since we have good reason to think that at least one mind-independent, non-
natural value exists, we have no general reason to think that mind-independent, non-
natural values are ontologically suspect. 																																																								
31 Perhaps debunkers can argue that aesthetic judgements are an outgrowth of a more general capacity 
for normative or evaluative judgements, which capacity also explains why moral requirements seem 
objective. Thanks to Bart Streumer for this suggestion. 
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C4. So, we have no general reason to think that mind-independent, non-natural moral 
values are ontologically suspect.  
 
 This argument's plausibility depends on a number of assumptions. In 
particular, it depends on the assumption that we have good reason to think that beauty 
is mind-independent, and the assumption that the best explanation of the impression 
that beauty is objective is that we actually perceive (or intuit) mind-independent 
beauty. I have my doubts about the first assumption, and will return to this below.  
 CGA1 tries to undermine the fact that moral values would have to be mind-
independent and non-natural in kind as a reason to reject their existence. It does not 
specifically target the fact that moral facts would involve categorical reasons. Most 
extant CGA's in metaethics do have this target. With respect to categorical reasons, 
companions in guilt have so far been sought in epistemic and prudential normativity 
(for examples of the former, see Shafer-Landau 2006, Cuneo 2007 and Rowland 
forthcoming; for an example of the latter, see Fletcher 2018). But what about 
aesthetics? If we suppose that beauty and artistic merit are mind-independent and 
non-natural in kind, might they provide categorical reasons?  
 I'll start with artistic merit. As Louise Hanson (2017) has argued, the kind of 
goodness involved in judgements to the effect that something is a good artwork is 
plausibly attributive goodness, or goodness qua member of its kind. If so, then it may 
seem doubtful that judgements about artistic goodness entail judgements about 
categorical reasons. After all, the fact that something is a good K (knife, house, gun, 
torture-method) does not in general entail that you have reason to do anything, let 
alone categorical reason.  
 The fact that something is a good K might, of course, give you a reason to do 
something, but only because that fact explains why it is (in some way) good 
simpliciter32, or because there are valid normative principles that require you to do 
something involving good Ks. But such further facts about good Ks are unlikely to 
follow from the concept 'good qua member of its kind'.  
 Nevertheless, there might be something about the concept of artistic goodness 
that sets it apart from other kinds of attributive goodness, such that judgements 
																																																								
32 See also Hanson (2017) .  
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involving it do entail judgements about categorical reasons. If there is such a 
difference, it is most likely to stem from the concept of art.  
 Some aestheticians define art such that anything that is art is necessarily 
valuable (e.g. R. G. Collingwood 1958, Bell 1914). As Hanson indicates, such views 
are vulnerable to a decisive objection: they cannot accommodate bad art (Dickie 
2000). So it is unlikely that judgements about artistic goodness entail judgements 
about categorical reasons because the concept of art is evaluative in this sense.  
 But there is another option. Attributive goodness is goodness qua member of 
its kind. This means that the standard of goodness is related to the kind of thing it is. 
In some (perhaps all?) cases, the standard is set by the function of the item: knives are 
for cutting, and a good knife performs that function well. If we take this model, and 
want to know the standard of good art, we need to know art's function.  
 If art has a function, it is related to human experience. Paintings, music, 
theatre (et.) are meant to provide perceptual-cum-cognitive experiences. If so, then 
one might propose that the function of art is to afford valuable experiences (perhaps 
of a certain type). Saying that a work of art is good would then amount to saying that 
it affords valuable experiences. This directly links judgements of artistic merit to 
judgements about valuable experiences, and can easily accommodate bad art: bad art 
fails to live up to the standard internal to it.33  
 Some philosophers believe that value is the source of reasons.34 They might 
say that if X is valuable, then we have reason to relate to X a certain way. This view 
would establish connections between judgements of artistic merit and reasons. Take 
the view that pleasure is intrinsically valuable. Those who hold this view can also 
hold that we have categorical reason to experience pleasure. Such people would say 
that although the reasons are generated by subjective mental states, it is not the fact 
that we desire pleasure, or that we value it, that explains why we have reason to 
pursue it. Now suppose that good art affords intrinsically valuable experiences (these 																																																								
33 Is this view vulnerable to my objections against the dispositional view? Perhaps. It depends on what 
it means to say that art affords a certain experience. A proponent of this view should take it to mean 
that a particular valuable experience is possible by attending to the object, without any commitment to 
it being guaranteed provided one meets certain non-evaluative criteria.  
34 Joseph Raz (1999) defends a version of the view. Stephen Finlay (2014) holds it as well, although he 
rejects the idea that goodness can generate reasons that have rational authority irrespective of our 
desires.  
	 21	
would plausibly include certain kinds of pleasure). One might then say that this 
entails that certain people, in certain contexts, have categorical reason to attend to 
good art (namely those people likely to have the relevant experiences upon attending 
to the work35).36  
 However, even if it could be shown that judgements about goodness in art 
entail judgements about categorical reasons, we still need to know whether there is 
independent reason to believe that good art exists in order to run a CGA that 
undermines the epistemic significance of categoricity.  
 One might argue that the best explanation of the fact that critics arrive at 
judgements about good art is that it really exists. One step in such an argument might 
again be an appeal to the difficulty of explaining why we should conceive of artistic 
goodness as mind-independent in the first place, if the property does not exist. What 
possible evolutionary benefit could attach to conceiving of artistic quality as mind-
independent? And if there is no evolutionary benefit, how might appreciative states 
give rise to the impression that goodness in art is objective?  
 Similar routes might be taken in the case of beauty. According to Roger 
Scruton, it is a platitude that beauty is always a reason for attending to the thing that 
possesses it (2011, p. 5). However, if a platitude is something fairly obvious, then 
Scruton's claim is not. Despite this, beauty might provide categorical reasons to attend 
to the object that possesses it. If there is reason to think that beauty is mind-
independent and that it is a value, one might (again) appeal to the idea that value 
grounds reasons to establish connections between beauty and reasons. As before, the 
failure of evolutionary or Kantian explanations of the sense of objectivity might 
undermine debunking explanations of our experiences. This would help to defend the 
reality of beauty, and allow a companions-in-guilt argument of the following kind 
(mutatis mutandis for artistic merit):  
 																																																								
35 The fact that this depends on context and psychological features of individuals does not make the 
reasons any less categorical, so long as the existence of those reasons is not explained by the fact that 
anyone wants to have or values having the relevant experiences.  
36 You might think that statements about what is good art do not entail anything about categorical 
reasons, because the following claim seems perfectly coherent: 'Mozart's requiem is good art, but I 
have / there is no reason to attend to it'. However, I don't think the intuitive evidence here is clear 
enough to confidently reject the hypothesis.  
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Companions-in-Guilt Argument 2 
 
P1. We have good reason to think that beauty is a mind-independent, non-natural 
value.  
P2. We have good reason to think that beauty exists.  
C1. So, we have good reason to think that at least one mind-independent, non-natural 
value exists.  
P3. We have good reason to think that mind-independent, non-natural values generate 
categorical reasons.  
C2. So, we have good reason to think that beauty generates categorical reasons.  
C3. So, we have good reason to think that at least some categorical reasons exist.   
P4. Since we have good reason to think that at least one mind-independent, non-
natural value exists, and that it generates categorical reasons, we have no general 
reason to think that mind-independent, non-natural value and categorical reasons are 
ontologically suspect. 
C4. So, we have no general reason to think that mind-independent moral values and 
categorical moral reasons are ontologically suspect.  
 
 Of course, the strength of CGA2 depends on many assumptions. It stands or 
falls with the idea that value generates reasons, that the best conception of beauty is as 
a mind-independent, non-natural value property, and that the best explanation of our 
conception of beauty is that mind-independent, non-natural beauty actually exists.  
 I have my doubts about the second assumption (and hence the third). Although 
Zangwill is adamant that we do not tolerate divergent judgements of beauty, and that 
we experience aesthetic properties as mind-independent, I cannot confirm this for 
myself. Although it is correct that I would not call divergent judgements true, it does 
not strike me that those who make such judgements are making a mistake. This is by 
no means as intuitively clear as is often claimed in the case of morals. Since the case 
for a mind-independent conception of beauty crucially depends on these alleged 
intuitive data, the case is not particularly strong. This seems to me a crucial 
asymmetry between morals and aesthetics, and explains why a mind-independent 
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conception of moral properties is more defensible than a mind-independent 
conception of beauty.37  
 Things are less straightforward when it comes to artistic merit. Perhaps we are 
less tolerant of diverging judgements here. But it is important to focus on the right 
cases. Hume was right that reasonable judgements about art are made in the light of a 
proper understanding of the work and a suitably impartial frame of mind. Any 
tendency to reject divergent judgements as mistaken had better not boil down to a 
failure to meet such criteria. So we must focus on cases where two people understand 
the work, know about the intended audience, place themselves in their shoes (etc.), 
yet come to different conclusions regarding the work's overall merit. I think that such 
cases are both possible and actual. Do we think that at least one of these two people is 
making a mistake?  
 At least in certain cases, the answer will be Yes. If meeting the Humean 
criteria is psychologically compatible with almost any reaction to a work of art, then 
one can understand Bach's aims in the Goldberg Variations, place oneself in the shoes 
of the intended audience, etc., yet still consider it a bad work of art. That may clearly 
seem mistaken. So if facts about intolerance can support a mind-independent 




In this paper, I have described one way to argue for a mind-independent conception of 
beauty and artistic merit. Such a conception allows the development of new 
companions-in-guilt arguments relating moral to aesthetic judgement. The strength of 
the arguments crucially depends on a phenomenological premise: that beauty and 
artistic merit appear to us to be objective. This premise is dubious in the case of 




37 This is one answer to Hanson (2018). Hanson argues against what she calls The Asymmetry Claim: 
the idea that mind-independent realism about beauty is less defensible than mind-independent realism 
about moral properties. She challenges those who believe in the asymmtry to isolate a relevant 
difference between beauty and moral properties.  
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